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Abstract
The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
focused on encouraging the adoption and deployment of high capacity Internet access and
the associated networks, commonly termed “broadband.” Our article sketches important
economic themes in the FCC’s National Broadband Plan to show how the application of
basic principles of regulatory economics takes account of rapid technological change.
We discuss natural monopoly regulation, externalities and cross-subsidies, network
effects and interconnection, the allocation of scarce inputs, protecting and fostering
competitive markets, and consumer protection and transparency as they apply to the
development of broadband.
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In early 2009, Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to develop a plan to ensure that every American has “access to broadband capability.”
That planning exercise resulted in the development of a National Broadband Plan (NBP),
which was issued in March 2010 (FCC, 2010a).
“Broadband” means high-capacity Internet access and the associated networks,
devices, content, and applications.1 The NBP describes its development as “the great
infrastructure challenge of the early 21st century” (FCC, 2010a, pp. xi, 29), in part
because of the Internet’s role as a “general purpose technology” (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995).
Creating the NBP required the Commission to apply longstanding principles of
economics and regulatory policy to an important and emerging sector of the
communications industry, in order to encourage the adoption and deployment of
broadband. The past year in economics at the FCC has focused on doing so; the
upcoming year will involve implementing the plan. Our article sketches important
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Although the National Broadband Plan does not explicitly define “broadband,” it sets a broadband

availability target for universal access at 4 Mbps download speed and 1 Mbps upload speed. The median
actual download speed today is 5-6 Mbps for fiber and cable and 1.5 Mbps for DSL. (FCC, 2010a, Chapter
8).
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economic themes in the National Broadband Plan to show how the application of basic
principles of regulatory economics takes account of rapid technological change.

I. Natural Monopoly?
Important sectors of the communications industry have long been thought to possess
natural monopoly features, which is a familiar basis for economic regulation. Most
importantly, economies of scale and density in deploying residential wireline
infrastructure mean that both telephone voice service and cable video service have each
traditionally been viewed as natural monopolies, at least over the “last mile” between the
house and the first switch. For this reason, local residential telephone service has
traditionally been subject to rate regulation in the states, and basic cable prices may also
be regulated. It can be difficult to regulate natural monopolies in communications
industries, however, for a number of reasons, as described below.

A. Changing Technology and Demand
First, technological change – a notable feature of communications since at least the
development of the telegraph and radio – may alter the scope of the natural monopoly.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, for example, the development of
microwave technologies for transmitting telephone calls made competition possible in
long distance services, which (like local telephone service) had been regulated as a
natural monopoly.
A similar phenomenon is occurring today with the convergence of the technologies
for providing voice and video over a wire, as both voice and video become merely data
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packets. With two wires to the typical house (the cable television line and the telephone
line), it is possible that the last mile could support two providers at anticipated levels of
future demand.2 And if users come to view wireless technologies – whether mobile or
fixed – as substitutes for wireline technologies for data and video services (as they
increasingly do for voice services), residential data transmission services could develop a
more competitive market structure.
But other, less competitive, scenarios are possible, and the NBP views future
broadband market structures as highly uncertain (FCC, 2010a, Chapter 4). Because
mobile wireless technologies appear more likely to be constrained in bandwidth than will
wireline technologies, the extent to which mobile wireless service will substitute for
wireline service depends in part on how demand evolves.3 If demand shifts more to highspeed applications than to mobile applications, the two services may be better viewed as
complements rather than as substitutes. In addition, all wireless broadband technologies,
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Historical circumstances may mean that wireline broadband services are provided by two firms in many

regions. Even if those services have natural monopoly characteristics, two firms may co-exist in an
unregulated market if they can successfully dampen the competition between themselves. A duopoly
industry structure could pose a risk to competition even absent a natural monopoly. But if the investments
that the cable television and the telephone providers in a locality make as they upgrade their facilities
reduce their differentiation, the result may be to encourage competition between the two.
3

A study conducted for the FCC in connection with the development of the NPB, based on the analysis of a

consumer survey, estimates that a representative household would be willing to pay $20 per month for
more reliable Internet service (service that goes down once or twice a year rather than once or twice a
month) holding constant speed, and $45 per month for an upgrade from dialup connection speed to a highspeed connection holding constant reliability (Rosston et al. 2010).

4

whether fixed or mobile, may be more prone than wireline to the possibility that
congestion would degrade its quality or raise its marginal cost and price.
Even if wireless technologies become important substitutes for wireline broadband,
moreover, it is unclear how much competition that sector will provide. For example, the
wireless sector could grow more competitive than today through the implementation of a
business plan to create a new national wireless provider that would employ combined
satellite and terrestrial technologies, made possible by a recent FCC merger decision
(FCC 2010b).4 But there are also reasons for concern about the prospects for wireless
competition (General Accounting Office 2010). The four national wireless service
providers and regional firms are facing an expensive upgrade to the next generation of
technologies (so-called fourth generation, or 4G) and the number of providers could
decline if some choose not to make that investment. And most of the leading wireless
service providers also offer wireline services,5 which may dampen their incentive to
compete aggressively with wireline providers.
The National Broadband Plan also points to a substantial uncertainty about the extent
of future competition among wireline broadband providers. By one forecast, 11% of
households in 2012 will have only one broadband wire to the home, another 45% of
households will choose between a cable provider that offers high-speed service and a
telephone provider that has not upgraded beyond DSL service to offer broadband on high
capacity fiber, and 30% more will choose between a cable provider with high speed
4

The new venture has been named LightSquared.
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Verizon and AT&T also offer wireline telephone services, and Sprint’s 4G wireless venture, Clear, is co-

owned by large cable television companies.
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service and a telephone provider that has upgraded only to fiber-to-the-node (essentially
the neighborhood) and not to fiber to the home (FCC, 2010a, p. 42 Exhibit 4-G). If this
forecast proves correct, 86% of households may have limited wireline competition for
high-bandwidth broadband services.6

B. Uncertainty and Natural Monopoly Regulation
Uncertainty about the scope of a natural monopoly creates a number of problems for a
regulatory agency. The most obvious problems involve the difficulties of applying an
error cost framework from decision theory when the probabilities and social benefits or
costs of a range of possible outcomes are hard to assess. In modern times, the FCC,
spurred by Congress, has generally made the necessary tradeoffs by choosing policies
that aim to encourage competition.7
In addition to evaluating uncertainty about the likely costs and benefits of alternative
regulatory decisions, the regulator must consider the costs and benefits of delay. A
regulator, like a firm that makes an investment decision under uncertainty, obtains an
option value from delaying its decision. Waiting until uncertainty about the world is
6

More generally, the extent of growth in demand for high-speed applications will likely affect whether and

how quickly cable providers upgrade to higher speed (DOCSIS) technologies, telephone providers upgrade
(from DSL to fiber), and wireless providers build out 4G networks. Under some scenarios, these providers
could differentiate – some offering higher speed services with others unable to do so, which would limit
competition for high speed broadband.
7

This bias may in part reflect the traditional public choice concern that large regulated incumbent firms

may have greater ability to influence political processes than do small rivals, entrants and consumers, and
consequently may capture regulatory agencies to act in their private interest.
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clarified avoids the possibility of locking-in what could turn out to be a suboptimal
regulatory strategy, and thus avoids inducing firms to make sunk investments conditional
on that strategy.
But regulatory delay also creates costs. When a firm’s investment decisions would
vary with the regulator’s choice of strategy and involve substantial sunk costs,
uncertainty as to regulation can lead firms to defer investments – in this case potentially
slowing the deployment of broadband technology. With respect to residential broadband
competition, the National Broadband Plan seeks to resolve this tradeoff by boosting the
prospects for wireless competition (through spectrum and other policies discussed below)
while simultaneously delaying regulatory action in favor of collecting better data to
monitor trends.8 This approach permits the FCC to act later to foster competition if it
seems viable or to regulate as necessary if the last mile of the emerging broadband
industry turns out to have natural monopoly characteristics or competition is otherwise
limited.

C. Scope Economies and Natural Monopoly Regulation
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The NBP recommends that the government make more spectrum available for wireless providers (FCC

2010a, Recommendation 4.1) and that it collect and analyze more information about broadband
availability, penetration, prices, churn and bundles offered by service providers (FCC 2010a,
Recommendation 4.2). The FCC issues an annual report analyzing the competition in the mobile wireless
industry; e.g., FCC (2010c).
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If residential wireline broadband turns out to be a natural monopoly but there are
scope economies in the provision of wireless and wireline services9 or in the provision of
residential and business services, natural monopoly regulation could be forced to deal
with a familiar complication: multi-product firms offering both regulated and
unregulated services. Multi-product firms can make it difficult for the regulator to
observe the costs of regulated services, most notable by making it hard to allocate joint
and common costs. Pre-breakup AT&T was thought to have exploited this problem to
distort competition in unregulated services (as well as to evade regulatory constraints).
The cost allocation problem would be exacerbated if two-sided markets are layered
onto regulated markets. Accordingly, regulatory price-setting would likely become even
more difficult if multi-product firms incorporate regulated services into two-sided
platforms. It is conceivable that this could occur for broadband – if, hypothetically,
residential broadband access were regulated as a natural monopoly, and if access
providers’ managed platforms assemble content (like video programming) to attract
subscribers and put together subscribers to attract advertisers in unregulated markets.
Local cable regulators have not confronted this problem, notwithstanding that cable
providers both manage a two-sided platform (selling both to consumers and to content
providers, who attract advertisers) and provide last-mile access (thought to have natural
monopoly characteristics).

9

AT&T and Verizon likely benefit from scope economies in the provision of wireless and wireline service

in their wireline territory. To a substantial extent, their wireless and wireline services share a common
infrastructure.
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II. Externalities and Cross-Subsidies
Another feature of communications markets also provides an additional basis for
some regulatory initiatives: the large external benefits that are generated by the provision
of communications services. These benefits go beyond network effects (demand-scale
economies arising from each consumer’s increased opportunities to interact with others)
to include innovation and economic growth – think of the Internet as a General Purpose
Technology (FCC, 2010a, p. 29, Box I-1).10 They also include non-market values:
enhancing free speech and fostering civic engagement.
All of these external benefits will likely grow as technology increasingly permits
rapid transmission of data, and not simply voice and video communications services.
These external benefits, along with distributional considerations, historically led
regulators to subsidize voice telephony services to lower income users and users with
high costs to serve (such as rural users). Decades ago, regulators sought to encourage
increased telephone subscribership through a system of implicit subsidies. The regulated
monopolist, which offered a full range of telephone services, set low rates for local
telephone service, particularly for residential customers in high cost and rural areas (as
through geographic rate averaging). Under this scheme, the higher rates for long distance
service and for business customers covered a relatively large share of the fixed, joint, and
common costs of telephone system operation. Moreover, telephone providers were
subjected to universal service or carrier-of-last-resort obligations, and compensated for
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By one account, the Internet is in select company, joining technologies like printing, the steam engine,

the factory system, railways, electricity, and the computer as one of only twenty-four “transforming general
purpose technologies” developed over the entire span of human history (Lipsey et al., 2005, p. 133).
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providing this service by setting higher prices to their customers (particularly, again,
business and long distance customers).
The shrinking natural monopoly led Congress in 1996 to introduce competition into
local telephone service, putting pressure on this informal regulatory compact. The crosssubsidies were not sustainable against partial line entry by firms that were “cherrypicking” to undercut prices on high-margin services. In consequence, regulators have
been led to unwind the old cross-subsidies and to replace them with direct transfers to
subsidized customers or the carriers that serve them, paid for by service charges on all
customers. The National Broadband Plan recommends that the FCC examine the
possibility of using market-based mechanisms, perhaps including reverse auctions, to
minimize the costs of providing subsidized service (FCC, 2010a, p. 145 and n.79).
Voice traffic is increasingly provided in the same way as other data, and data
providers now include cable, wireless, and satellite companies as well as traditional
telephone firms. Accordingly, the NBP proposes to extend the modern approach to
providing universal service from telephony to broadband by introducing a new program
that focuses on subsidizing broadband infrastructure buildout in high cost areas that are
unlikely to be served by the private sector (FCC 2010a, Recommendation 8.2). To fund
these programs, the NBP proposes to broaden the requirement for contribution to the
universal service fund beyond the current base (FCC 2010a, Recommendation 8.10).

III. Network Effects and Interconnection
Communications networks are characterized by strong network effects: the value of
participation increases when the number of other participants rises. The network effects
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that are associated with telephony and email are commonly viewed as direct effects:
They are associated with the ability of each party to communicate with each other. The
Internet adds indirect network effects: Even if most users do not communicate directly,
the content and applications that are available to each user are richer because of the
number of other users on the system.
The network effects that arise in communications markets depend upon the
interconnection of users and their sub-networks. The value of interconnection is not
necessarily a reason for regulation on its own, as firms that participate in communications
networks generally have strong private incentives to interconnect. But this is not always
the case. Standards wars can slow interconnection, as can the development of separate
networks (with different standards) in separate geographic areas. As an example of the
latter, think of early railroads in the U.S. laying track with different gauges, or the
absence of compatibility between U.S. and European systems in electrical appliances and
televisions; as an example of the former, think of the absence of customers’ wireless
roaming between carriers using the GSM standard and those that adopted CDMA.
Moreover, dominant firms may have an incentive to deny or impede interconnection to
rivals (or, to similar effect, overcharge them for interconnection) in order to preserve
their market power. Before the Bell System was broken up in early 1980s, for example,
AT&T was frequently embroiled in disputes about interconnection with firms that sought
to provide competing long distance service.
In light of this history, competition regulators must be concerned about the potential
for similar problems to arise in interconnection involving the Internet. The NBP does not
discuss the possibility that the leading backbone providers could harm competition by
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raising the costs of peering for smaller rivals – in the current environment, this specific
problem appears entirely theoretical – but it does note complaints that some rural
incumbent carriers are resisting interconnection with competitive telecommunications
carriers; it recommends that the FCC review interconnection obligations as part of a
proceeding that asks for comment on various aspects of the transition from circuit
switched to packet based networks; and it notes that the FCC is now considering a
proposal to require broadband Internet access service providers to treat lawful content,
applications and services in a nondiscriminatory manner (FCC 2010, Recommendation
4.10 and pp. 58-59). The NBP also does not take a view as to the benefits and costs of a
possible standards competition in the development of fourth generation (4G) wireless
networks among technologies such as “high speed packet access” (HSPA), WiMAX, and
“long term evolution” (LTE).
The benefits of interconnection also lie behind the NBP’s recommendation that the
FCC move forward with its open proceeding on roaming obligations for mobile providers
that offer data services (FCC, 2010a, Recommendation 4.11). Roaming arrangements for
voice service allow a wireless telephone customer to stay connected when traveling
outside the reach of his or her provider’s network by using the network of another
provider; the NBP recommendation concerns roaming obligations for wireless data
services. This proceeding is concerned with ensuring interconnection without
discouraging the mobile broadband providers from building out and upgrading their own
facilities.

IV. Allocation of Scarce Inputs
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Spectrum is an essential input into wireless communication. It is scarce in the sense
that there appears to be a fixed range of useable frequencies, although technological
developments such as cell splitting have made it possible over time to use the spectrum
that has been set aside for communications more intensively and to use a wider range of
spectrum for that task. Still, given today’s technology, the existing allocations of
spectrum, and the ongoing rapid growth rate of wireless services, the NBP takes the view
that the marginal cost of this input will likely soon be steeply increasing for wireless
providers.
New technologies and changing FCC priorities have led in the past to alterations in
the way spectrum is used – for example, to facilitate the introduction of cellular phones or
digital television. The best use of spectrum may change from one decade to the next,
which raises the importance of developing mechanisms to identify higher valued uses and
to reallocate spectrum to those uses.
Input scarcity and changing valuations are not by themselves necessarily reasons for
regulation; the allocation and reallocation of scarce resources may be what markets do
best. But spectrum usage raises unusually complex coordination problems that may
justify regulatory intervention to support the market. In particular, spectrum must be
allocated in a way that avoids interference across frequency bands and across geographic
boundaries.11 Moreover, it may be necessary technologically, or at least confer
substantial cost savings, to permit spectrum users to employ contiguous blocks of
frequencies (both across frequencies and geographic regions). Markets may not
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Even worse, spectrum may be subject to “intermodulation” problems, by which two broadcasters do not

interfere until a third comes in.
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successfully move underutilized spectrum to higher value uses even if incumbents are
permitted greater flexibility in spectrum use because of the need to assemble large
contiguous blocks for new uses and the incentives of incumbents to hold out for a
significant share of the gain.
The coordination difficulties that arise from interference may be exacerbated by the
path dependence that arises from past investments. For example, had satellite radio
broadcasters chosen to deploy more expensive receivers that are more resistant to
interference, it might now be possible to allow higher limits on the power that is
employed by users of adjoining spectrum blocks, increasing the value of that adjoining
spectrum.
The NBP’s spectrum discussion is premised on a view that recent technological
change has likely made wireless services a higher valued use for some spectrum, at
appropriate frequencies, than its current use (Kwerel and Williams, 1992). The NBP
notes a range of reallocation possibilities, including changes in the use of some spectrum
that is now allocated to satellite, broadcast television, and federal uses. To determine
whether this is so, and to reallocate spectrum if it is, the NBP encourages the use of
market mechanisms (FCC 2010a, Chapter 5).
One NBP proposal is already moving forward: The FCC has proposed changing the
rules regarding spectrum that is allocated to mobile satellite uses in order to facilitate the
deployment of complementary terrestrial networks that share the frequency, thereby
enhancing coverage in urban areas or inside buildings, where the satellite signal is
attenuated or unavailable (FCC, 2010d; FCC, 2010a, Recommendation 5.8.4). This
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particular spectrum is tied to mobile satellites because its allocation is coordinated
internationally, and thus lies beyond the ability of the FCC to alter on its own.
Another spectrum reallocation problem that is highlighted in the NBP involves UHF
broadcast television spectrum. If some other use, such as wireless broadband, now has a
higher value than does broadcast television for some of that spectrum, and if today’s
broadcasters are not the best parties to provide the alternative service, the spectrum could
be put to better use by encouraging the movement of spectrum from the broadcasters to
other firms. To find out whether this switch makes sense, and if it does, to facilitate it,
the NBP proposes to develop a market mechanism that would permit incumbent
broadcasters to receive compensation if they voluntarily release spectrum by
discontinuing over-the-air broadcasting or “channel share” (multicast on the same
channel) with other broadcasters (FCC, 2010a, Recommendation 5.8.5).12 If any
spectrum is voluntarily given up by broadcasters, moreover, that spectrum must then be
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Although spectrum is a public asset, and the government has the legal right to reallocate it at will,

incumbents are generally treated as though they have quasi-property rights in their spectrum license in
order to provide appropriate incentives for licensees and their customers to make long term investments.
Reallocation under such circumstances requires that compensation be paid to the incumbent licensee. If
compensation is set through negotiation, the process of spectrum reallocation could become mired in
bargaining impasses; if it is set through regulatory determination, it will likely involve substantial
administrative costs. A market mechanism employs a third approach: enlisting competition to determine
the appropriate level of compensation.
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repacked into contiguous blocks to make it more valuable for alternative uses.13 Finally
the repackaged spectrum must be auctioned to new providers.
The NBP contemplates developing an “incentive auction” mechanism to accomplish
these tasks (FCC, 2010a, Recommendation 5.4). As a design problem, it poses several
challenges. It is necessary to develop a procedure for constructing both a supply curve
(from the broadcasters) and a demand curve (by bidders such as broadband providers) in
order to clear the market, while simultaneously defining the scope of the repackaged
product. This might be accomplished simultaneously in a single exchange.
Alternatively, it might be accomplished sequentially, by first conducting a reverse
auction to determine the cost of clearing spectrum and then conducting a forward auction
for cleared spectrum. By combining information from both auctions, spectrum would be
cleared up to the point where the value of a spectrum unit in the new use in a particular
market equals the cost of clearing that unit, subject to the requirement of maintaining an
acceptable amount of over-the-air broadcasting.
Finally, the NBP proposes reallocating some spectrum that is now devoted to federal
uses. That spectrum might include a block that could be combined with other spectrum
that is now available in order to make a more valuable package for auction (FCC, 2010a,
Recommendation 5.8.3; see Obama, 2010).14 Relatedly, the NBP proposes to encourage
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In principle one could imagine delegating the repacking to a market mechanism, but such a mechanism is

difficult to devise, particularly when the optimal scope of spectrum packages (both in terms of frequencies
and geography) varies with the use to which the spectrum would be put.
14

Some current technologies for mobile wireless rely on utilizing “paired” blocks of frequencies in similar

parts of the spectrum.
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the reallocation of spectrum that is not licensed for flexible use – whether used by
governmental entities or private firms – by seeking authority to impose fees on that
spectrum that reflects its opportunity cost (FCC, 2010a, Recommendation 5.6). Such fees
promise to induce licensees to use spectrum more efficiently and perhaps, in
consequence, reduce their holdings, making more spectrum available for other uses.

V. Protecting and Fostering Competitive Markets
The modern trajectory of federal communications policy has been directed toward
creating and protecting competitive communications services markets. This has been the
collective import of developments such as the FCC’s 1968 decision that opened the Bell
System to competition in customer premises equipment, the FCC’s 1974 decision that
required AT&T to allow new private line long distance carriers to connect with the local
telephone networks, the 1984 AT&T divestiture that resolved the government’s antitrust
case against the firm, the program access rules that were instituted in the 1992 cable
legislation that required vertically integrated cable operators to make their own
programming available to cable distribution rivals, and the 1996 legislation that allowed
local telephone firms to provide long distance when their local markets had become
sufficiently competitive.
After decades of change, both regulatory and technological, the industry has grown
substantially more competitive, but the work of fostering competition is far from
complete. Accordingly, the NBP makes the protection and fostering of competition an
important theme; competition is the subject of the first nine recommendations in the
Executive Summary (FCC, 2010a, p. xi). One concern arises from the possibility that a
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multi-product firm with a dominant position in some markets could take advantage of
that position to prevent the growth of competition in complementary markets in which it
also participates – either to obtain market power in the complementary market or protect
market power in the original market. (Even competition in the original market may be
insufficient to protect locked-in buyers of the complement from the subsequent exercise
of market power by the seller, if buyers were unaware of that potential at the time of their
original purchase and did not obtain a compensating discount then.15) This issue does not
hinge on whether any activities of the multiproduct firm are regulated as natural
monopolies, though they could be, as with the pre-breakup AT&T.
This problem is addressed in the NBP. One recommendation would protect
unaffiliated (pure-play) wireless carriers from the high costs that could be imposed by
vertically integrated wireless rivals that own the high-capacity fiber links to wireless
towers that are used for backhaul (FCC 2010a, Recommendations 4.7 and 4.8).16 This
recommendation aims mainly to protect competition on price in the complementary
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The economic issue of whether competition in primary markets prevents anticompetitive harm in

aftermarkets was extensively analyzed in the context of commentary on the Supreme Court’s antitrust
decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see, e.g., McKie-Mason
and Netz (1995) and Shapiro (1995).
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The NBP also recommends equalizing the rates that electric utilities charge cable television companies

and telephone companies for attachments to utility poles in their right of way (FCC, 2010a,
Recommendation 6.1). In general, the telephone companies pay more than do cable companies, which
distorts incentives to invest in broadband deployment. The source of the price differential is not
exclusionary conduct by the cable companies, however; it is instead a legacy of differing past regulatory
regimes.
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market. Other recommendations are targeted more at fostering innovation competition in
complementary products. These include requiring multi-channel video programming
distributors (MVPDs), including cable companies, to install an inexpensive gateway
device with a standard interface that allows consumer products manufacturers to develop
and market televisions, set-top boxes, and other in-home devices independently of the
MVPD firm.
The FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking proceeding similarly aims, in part, to protect
incentives for innovation “at the edge” of the network by firms that offer content and
applications that are complementary to broadband Internet access (FCC, 2010a, pp. 3649). That is, one concern at issue in the rulemaking is the possibility that the transaction
costs of contracting, spillover benefits of applications innovation, and perhaps the market
power of Internet service providers may limit innovation in applications that are
complementary to the network. Yet any rules that address this possibility must also
ensure adequate incentives for investment and innovation in the network – or the
platforms, if wireless and wireline service are viewed as imperfect substitutes. The latter
issue raises a recurring question for policy-makers of when to emphasize greater
appropriability versus greater competition as a means of fostering innovation and
investment.17
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This tradeoff is analyzed with respect to innovation in the context of antitrust rules in Baker (2007). The

Open Internet rulemaking raises still other economic issues, including the social welfare effects of price
discrimination on both sides of two-sided platforms (particularly how these effects depend on the extent to
which mobile Internet service substitutes for fixed service for different types of customers or on the number
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VI. Consumer Protection and Transparency
Consumer protection provides another longstanding justification for economic
regulation (Armstrong, 2008; Beales et al., 1981). If the market does not provide
consumers with inexpensive, clear, and reliable information, and the government can do
so without bearing or imposing substantial costs – as through requiring disclosure –
consumers may be able to match purchases better with their preferences.18 If, in addition,
buyers are able to search more effectively among sellers, firms may experience more
elastic demand for their products, leading to lower consumer prices. These are not the
only possible consequences of improving the information that is available to buyers – the
increased information exchange could instead reduce seller discounting, for example
(Albæk et al., 1997; Baker, 1996)19 – but it is likely in general that improved seller
disclosure will benefit buyers. Consumer protection also involves policing deceptive
seller marketing practices, discouraging seller fraud, and protecting consumer privacy
when market forces like seller reputations are inadequate to do the job on their own.
The NBP highlights several areas in which consumer information appears less than
ideal, given the ease in which it could be provided. It emphasizes that actual broadband
of fixed and mobile providers that are available in a region) and how best to provide incentives for efficient
network operation (perhaps through congestion pricing or network management).
18

Bar-Gill and Stone (2009) argue that disclosures can discourage firms from taking advantage of

systematic consumer misjudgments about their mobile phone usage.
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Improved information to buyers could also undermine certain outcomes in which informed consumers

benefit from the presence of uninformed buyers (Armstrong, 2008, pp. 119-25).
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speeds are less than half the advertised speed (FCC, 2010a, p. 21). To address this
problem, it calls on the FCC to establish technical standards for key attributes of
broadband performance, measure how broadband providers stack up against the
standards, and publish the results (FCC, 2010a, Recommendations 4.3 and 4.4). The
FCC has already begun to do so.20

VII.

Conclusion

The FCC’s National Broadband Plan contains much more than has been emphasized
here. Many recommendations are designed to encourage the private sector to take
advantage of the opportunities for innovation that widespread broadband deployment will
provide in health care, education, energy and the environment, job training and
community development, government performance, civic engagement, and public safety.
But the core of the plan involves the traditional concerns of economic regulation:
targeting limited government intervention to address market failures in order to create
and support a robust competitive marketplace for communications services. During the
past year, the FCC relied on economic analysis to develop a plan for broadband; in future
years the agency will rely on economic analysis to implement it.
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